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Implication of Civil Remedies Under the Indian Civil Rights
Act
The field of American Indian law is complex and, to the uninitiated, often startling. Prior to 1968, for example, no person, whether
or not he was an Indian, could sue an Indian government in federal
court for the deprivation of his civil rights. 1 However, in that year
the Indian Civil Rights Act2 (ICRA) prohibited tribes from infring..
ing upon certain enumerated rights, similar to those in the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment, 3 and expressly provided that
1. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (no federal court habeas corpus
review of Indian court conviction); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribe, 272
F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) (first amendment does not apply to Indian governments); Barta v. Oglala Sioux, 259 F.2d 553, 556-67 (8th Cir. 1958) (fourteenth
amendment limitations on state action do not apply to Indian governments). See also
Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973).
However, a possible ground for federal court review of Tribal infringement of
civil rights has always existed. If there is sufficient federal involvement with a
tribal government, the restrictions of the Bill of Rights might be applied to the
tribal government's actions. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1965); text at notes 112-26 infra.
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970) (amended 1974). In addition to guaranteeing
various civil rights for Indians, ICRA directs the Secretary of the Interior to draft a
"model code to govern the administration of justice by courts of Indian offenses on
Indian reservations," 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970), and establishes a mechanism by which
jurisdiction over Indians previously assumed by states may be retroceded to the
federal government. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970). The Act also requires Indian consent to any further state assumptions of jurisdiction over Indians. 25 U.S.C. §§
1321-22 (1970).
3. 25 u.s.c. § 1302 (1970):
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) taken any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
_punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months
or a fine of $500 or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process
ofllaw;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
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persons detained by an Indian government in violation of the Act
could bring a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 4 Several courts
have subsequently gone considerably further and found that ICRA
also impliedly created a federal civil remedy for violation of the rights
guaranteed by the Act. 5
This Note will discuss neither -the wisdom of the express provisions
of ICRA nor the desirability of express creation by Congress of a
federal civil remedy. 6 The purpose of this Note is, instead, ,to analyze
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury or not less than six persons.
ICRA varies from the Bill of Rights in three significant respects: the establishment of religion is not prohibited, the right to counsel is guaranteed only at the
defendant's own expense, and an Indian government is prohibited from denying "equal
protection of its laws," 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970), while the fourteenth amendment
prohibits states from denying "equal protection of the laws."
In addition, ICRA's provisions have not been interpreted to create precisely the
same rights and duties as the similarly worded provisions of the Bill of Rights. See
Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th
Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973); Yellow Bird
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974); text at notes 18-19
infra.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970): "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe."
5. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th
Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 202 (9th
Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1973); Solomon v.
LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715, 721 (D. Neb. 1971); Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp.
370, 372 (D.N.M. 1971); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). Contra,
e.g., Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (D. Wyo. 1970),
affd. sub nom., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
6. ICRA seeks to accommodate the civil rights of individual Indians with the
right of Indian nations to self-determination and self-government. In striking a
balance between these countervailing interests, Congress provided for the enforcement of Indian civil rights in the federal courts only to the extent of habeas
corpus actions; express civil remedies were apparently viewed as incompatible
with the self-determination of Indian nations, or at least as not crucial to the protection of civil rights. See generally text at notes 127-77 infra.
It is obviously possible to disagree with the precise balance of interests struck in
ICRA. Thus, one view may be that because Indians are United States citizens, the
federal government is responsible for protecting their individual rights, even
against- Indian governments. From this perspective, enforcement provisions of
ICRA may appear inadequate and the express creation of civil remedies necessary.
See generally Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th
Cir. 1973) (implying a civil remedy because the "Indian Civil Rights Act creates a
substantive body of rights . • . to 'extricate the individual Indian' from decisions
holding a controversy between an Indian and his tribal government . . . an internal
controversy").
On the other hand, ICRA may be viewed as essentially paternalistic legislation
that interferes with the self-government of Indians. From this perspective, not
only the proposed creation of express civil remedies but also the express habeas corpus
provisions presently in ICRA would be rejected. See Coulter, Federal Law and
Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights,
3 CoLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS L. RBv. 49, 50 (1971) (''The Indians view
Congress' action as a further weakening of Indian self-government in the name of protecting Indians from their own people. They see the Indian Bill of Rights as another
imposition by a white government of white standards, values, and governmental
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the bases upon which remedies have been implied by federal
courts and to question whether implication is consistent with standards
of statutory interpretation appropriate for Indian law. It is contended
that the implication of federal civil remedies against Indian governments is improper and that if such remedies are to be created, precedent and policy mandate that they be the product of Congress. The
Note will first briefly examine the potential impact that the implication of civil remedies may :have upon Indian government and will
then summarize the analytical deficiencies of those federal cases in
which such remedies have actually ,been implied. The remainder of
-the Note will, in some detail, outline and discuss a proposed framework for judicial analysis of the implication of remedies in the field
of Indian law.
The substantial impact that implied civil remedies may have upon
Indian culture is evident from a survey of Indian practices that have
been challenged in suits under ICRA. In making this review, it is
essential to keep in mind that while the legal principles upon which
ICRA claims are based have a solid foundation in the Anglo.American tradition, Indian nations have -been guided for centuries by
fundamentally different customs, mores, and legal practices. Any
attempt, however well-intentioned, to force Indian institutions into
the Anglo-American mold invites the danger that tribal governments
long held legitimate by the Indian ,people will be altered beyond recognition. This potential for the radical alteration of cherished institutions is shown in Dodge v. Nakai. 1 In that case, the federal district
court allowed a civil suit charging violations of the free speech, 8 due
process, 9 and bill of attainder10 provisions of ICRA to challenge a
Navajo Advisory Committee order excluding a non-Indian employee
from the reservation for excessive meddling in Navajo politics and
for showing disrespect to the Committee. The court invalidated the
order upon a finding that the Committee, which is vested with both
legislative and judicial power, had failed to conduct itself like a
"judicial" body11 and that -the punishment did not fit the offense. 12
This ruling, based as it is on Anglo-American legal principles, not
only opens -the substantive tribal law to challenge but also allows the
federal court to scrutinze ·both the structure and procedures of the
traditional Indian governments. The result in Dodge is nothing less
than a judgment on the validity of •the tribal government itself; the
theory upon once sovereign tribes"). See also AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYERS AsICRA-FIVB YEARS LATER 61 (1973); V. DELORIA, OF UTMosr
(1971); W. WASHBURN, THB INDIAN IN AMERICA 272 (1975).
7. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
·
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
10. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(9) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
11. 298 F. Supp. at 33-34.
12. See 298 F. Supp. at 31-32.
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Navajos were apparently given the choice of transforming their institutions and practices or facing litigation in federal courts to enjoin
their activities.
Other provisions of ICRA also portend substantial incursions
upon Indian cultur:e if civil actions based on these provisions continue
to be recognized. Federal enforcement of the prohibition on the
taking of private property without just compensation13 could undermine ithe basic principles of property ownership held by many Indian
nations. 14 Many rights -and privileges in some tribes that -are based
upon matrilineal15 and patrilineal1 6 traditions would be subject to
challenge on equal protection grounds. 17 The refusal of tribal governments to allow Indians to use Indian land may be challenged on
ICRA due process grounds. 18 Although :the courts have uniformly
held that the statutory rights of equal protection and due process in
ICRA are not coextensive with the similarly worded provisions of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, 19 some federal courts have
applied these rights outside the criminal justice context. 20 Indian
election procedures, 21 apportionment, 22 and land use controls, 28 all
of which are directly related to the structure of Indian society, have
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
14. Indian property is commonly owned by the tribe, not by individual Indians.
See Crowe v. Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1236 (4th Cir.
1974); Seneca Constitutional Rights Org. v. George, 348 F. Supp. 50, 59 (W.D.N.Y.
1972). This system of property ownership could be seriously undermined if
termination of tribal land leases or assignments to individual Indians gave rise
to claims for compensation cognizable in federal courts, which are insensitive to
Indian culture. Leaving non-habeas enforcement of the substantive provisions of
section 1302 to Indian courts, see text at notes 154-59 infra, insures an accommodation
of Indian culture with the civil rights guaranteed by ICRA.
15. Many New York tribes follow a matrilineal tradition of inheritance. See
G. SNYDERMAN, BEHIND nm TREE OF PEACE, A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF IROQUOIS
WARFARE (1948).
16. Tribal membership is often based on patrilineal criteria. See Martinez
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975). See also Jacobson v. Forest
County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
17. ICRA contains an equal protection provision. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8)
(1970); note 3 supra.
18. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir.
1975). For the due process provision of ICRA, see 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970);
note 3 supra.
19. See, e.g., Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d
1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir.
1973); Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974).
20. See cases cited note 5 supra.
21. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079
(8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F. Supp.
1194 (D.S.D. 1975); White v-. Tribal Council, 383 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1974);
McCUrdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973), revd., 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.
1974).
22. Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); Daly v. United
States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973).
23. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
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also been challenged in civil suits based on these newly established
civil rights.
·
The federal courts that have implied civil remedies under ICRA
have used a deficient analytical framework. First, while ,these courts
have ,properly assumed jurisdiction for such claims on federal question
grounds, 24 they have not adequately explained their assumption of
jurisdiction on grounds of the general grant over oases arising under
civil rights acts. 25 Second, in their haste to reach the merits of a
case, the courts have confused the presence of subject-matter jurisdiction with the existence of a cause of action, despite the fact that a
grant of jurisdiction, even if it is explicit, does not automatically
create grounds for the implication of civil actions and remedies. 20
24. E.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 21-25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) ). The leading case of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946), holds that, where a complaint in federal court is drawn to seek recovery
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the court must entertain the
suit. 327 U.S. at 681-82. The only exceptions, where the alleged claim appears to
be either immaterial or frivolous, 327 U.S. at 682, are inapposite to claims for
relief under ICRA. One final problem, however, is whether ICRA claims have a
matter in controversy that exceeds $10,000, as is required by section 1331. The
general rule is that courts must not dismiss an action unless they can hold that, as a
.legal certainty, the plaintiffs at final hearing will be unable to justify the jurisdictional claims which they have pleaded. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d
Cir. 1972). Although a virtual presumption of jurisdictional amount has been
attributed to such fundamental rights as free speech, see Cortright v. Resor, 325 F.
Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), valuation of other rights protected by ICRA may
be a matter for case-by-case determination.
25. See, e.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970)). Section 1343(4) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person . . . to recover damages or to secure equitable or other
relief under any Act of Congress providing. for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." (emphasis added). If read literally, the statute requires
that a civil action be authorized by law before jurisdiction can be granted; thus,
the absence of express civil remedies in ICRA would appear to preclude federal
court jurisdiction over Indians under section 1343(4). The courts, however, with
virtually no explication, have used an analytically dubious "bootstrap" approach by
first ·using this provision to obtain jurisdiction in the absence of civil actions authorized by law and, after finding jurisdiction, then declaring that civil actions and
remedies must be implied to effectuate the purpose of the statute. This approach
has been both condemned, see Zionitz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An
Analysis of Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20
S.D. L. R.Ev. I, 36-38 (1975), and endorsed, see Comment, The Indian Bill of
Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343,
1372-73 (1969). It is hoped that courts faced with the problem in the future will
explain more fully their assumption of jurisdiction.
26. See M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 749 (1973). For an example
of the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and a claim for relief, see
Turner v. United States and Creek Nations, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (special act of
Congress authorizing Court of Claims to render judgment as law and equity may
require in the claim of Clarence W. Turner did not create a substantive right to
recover on the claim absent specific legislation creating a cause of action). See
also Zionitz, supra note 25, at 29-33.
Thus, to state that federal courts have jurisdiction over all civil actions found
to arise under possible implications of ICRA in no way settles the essential question
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Finally, the courts have failed to consider adequately the impact of
their decisions on Indian society, though such a consideration should
be part of any judicial implication of rights in the field of Indian laiw.
The -two Supreme Court cases upon which cour,ts have primarily
relied to imply civil remedies, Jones v. Mayer2 7 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents, 28 are not compelling authority for the implication
of remedies under ICRA. The decision in Mayer empowered a district
court to fashion remedies for civil rights violations notwithstanding
the lack of an express remedy in the statute. 29 Clearly, then, the
absence of an express remedy does not prohibit a federal court from
fashioning appropriate equitable relief. 30 However, · this in no way
delineates the criteria by which a federal court should determine what
remedies may ibe appropriate nor is it -a mandate to fashion remedies
notwithstanding countervailing policy considerations. The Jones
Court clearly refrained from deciding the circumstances under which
certain remedies might be implied. 31
In Bivens, which is also frequently cited by lower courts, 32 the
Supreme Court held that a cause of action for damages was sustainable against a federal official who, under color o~ l_aw, carried on
of whether it is appropriate for federal courts to imply civil actions under ICRA
at all.
27. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
28. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
29. See 392 U.S. at 412 n.1: "To vindicate their rights [under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 § 1,] 42 U.S.C. § 1982 [(1970)], the petitioners invoked the
jurisdiction of the District Court to award 'damages or . . . equitable or other •
relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . • . .'
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) {(1970)]." It is arguable that civil actions not expressly provided for by statute are not civil actions authorized by law so as to come within
the jurisdictional grant of section 1343(4). See note 25 supra. If this is true,
then the Court above passes over a number of steps in going from the rights
articulated in section 1982, which provides for no express civil actions, to the
jurisdiction granted in section 1343 (4) to award civil remedies. The Court should
have declared that a complaint requesting implied civil relief under section 1982 comes
within the jurisdiction of federal courts under the federal question jurisdiction of
section 1331. Having jurisdiction over the suit, the Court should have then determined that section 1982 implies the use of civil actions to enforce the rights created.
This would have imparted "legal authorization" to civil suits under section 1982
bringing them within the federal court. The quoted footnote in Mayer, then,
only supports the proposition that if civil actions are properly implied under a
statute, federal courts have jurisdiction to grant a civil remedy under section
1343(4). The case is not support for the proposition that all federal civil
rights statutes, due to section 1343(4), imply the use of civil actions for their
enforcement. The criteria by which civil actions are to be implied from civil rights
statutes were not articulated by the Mayer court. See text at note 31 infra.
30. 392 U.S. at 414 n.13: "The fact that [the Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1,]
42 U.S.C. § 1982 [(1970)], is couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit
method of enforcement does not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning
an effective equitable remedy [under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970)]." See note 29
supra.
31. 392 U.S. at 414 n.14.
32. See, e.g., Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971).
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unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of a person's fourth
amendment rights. 33 Bivens is even less apposite than Mayer as a
source of •authority for implication of civil remedies under ICRA for
-at least two reasons. First, the Bivens Court was implying a remedy
for a constitutional violation. Congress had neither provided for
nor apparently even considered any remedies for such violations. In
cases arising under ICRA, in contrast, the rights are statutorily based;
Congress deliberated on the question of remedies and expressly settled
on only one-habeas corpus. Moreover, aggrieved parties are not
left without a means of redress, since they may also maintain an action
in tribal courts. 34 Whether additional remedies should be implied
is dependent upon a construction of the statutory rights contained in
ICRA, which rights are clearly not coextensive with those guaranteed by the Constitution. 35
Courts attempting to use Bivens as authority for implication. of
ICRA remedies have also failed to note the express qualification of
the Bivens Court itself that the case involved "no special factors
counselling hesitation [in implying a remedy] in the absence of affirm.:
ative action by Congress."36 There are, indeed, "special factors" in
the area of Indian law that counsel against implication of civil remedies and which in fact suggest that such implication actually violates
the Court's intention in Bivens. These factors are the special status
of Indians within the American legal system and the impact of civil
suits on the ability of Indians to govern themselves. Concern for
Indian self-government is well established in our law. First, many
Indian nations have treaties with the United States that guarantee
them the right of self-government, 37 and the precedent in Indian law
is clear that although Congress may unilaterally modify the terms of
a treaty, 38 such modification or breach will not be lightly implied. 30
Despite the direct interference with the rights to self-government that
implied civil remedies represent, courts have uniformly failed to
investigate whether the Indian nation defending the suit possesses
such treaty rights. Second,.Indian sovereignty is traditionally subject
to infringement only by express congressional legislation. 40 Although
it is possible for an Indian nation to become so related to the federal
government that a "sovereignty" bar to implied civil actions may become inapplicable, 41 the courts implying civil remedies have also
uniformly failed to examine the issue ·of sovereignty. The failure to
33.
34.
35.
36.
31.
38.
39.
40.
41.

403 U.S. at 389.
See note 156 infra and text at notes 154-58 infra.
See text at note 19 supra.
403 U.S. at 396.
See text at notes 47-51 infra.
See text at note 59 infra.
See note 61 infra and text at notes 61-72 infra.
See text at notes 83-90 infra.
See text at notes 109-19 infra.

November 1976]

Implication of Civil Remedies

217

consider treaty rights and sovereignty is a fatal deficiency in the analysis of courts that have implied civil remedies under ICRA.
A final shortcoming of courts that have erroneously relied on
Mayer and Bivens is their failure to follow other current Supreme
Court decisions not involving Indian law that establish the proper
framework for determining when a cause of action should be implied
from a federal statute. 42 As will ,be demonstrated below,4 3 even if
no treaty rights of self-government or requisite sovereignty exist in a
particular case to create a bar to implication of rnmedies, a proper
consideration of the legislative history of ICRA indicates that a civil
cause of action should generally not be implied.

A

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

The a:bove factors indicate that a court confronted with a civil
suit based on ICRA should adopt the following analysis. It should
first determine whether the defendant Indian nation possesses either
a treaty that guarantees the right of self-government or a requisite
degree of sovereignty. If the finding is affirmative, the court, in
construing ICRA, should adhere to a long line of precedent holding
that a statute in conflict with treaty rights or sovereignty should not
be construed broadly. 44 Accordingly, because civil remedies may
interfere with the :ability of Indians to govern themselves, 45 thus
violating treaty and sovereignty rights, a court should refuse to imply
such a remedy unless the legislative history of the statute strongly
supports implication. Even if the court determines that no treaty or
sovereignty rights are involved, however, it should not imply civil
remedies lightly. It should instead carefully balance the factors set
forth by recent Supreme Court cases, 46 which include examination
of congressional intent, and be extremely reluctant .to impinge upon
the decision-making processes even of Indian governments that lack
the protections of treaties or actual sovereignty.
A.

Treaty Rights

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that treaties with
Indian tribes bind the United States47 and preclude state action that
violates treaty provisions. 48 Among the rights that have been guaran42. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
43. See text at notes 127-59 infra.
44. See text at notes 47-126 infra.
45. See text at notes 7-23 supra.
46. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
47. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
48. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States
v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
Treaties bind the United States and preclude inconsistent state action only in
the absence of unilateral abrogation by Congress. See text at note 59 infra.
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teed to signatory Indian tribes is the right of the ,tribe to control internal affairs solely through an Indian government. The provision of
such rights is frequently explicit, 40 although the Supreme Court has
held that they may be implicit within the terms of a treaty. In the
1958 case of Williams v. Lee, 50 for example, the Court reversed a
state court order requiring an Indian to pay a debt incurred on the
Navajo Reservation -to a White shop-owner doing business on the
reservation. One ground on which the Court denied state court
jurisdiction was that,
[i]n return for. [Indian] promises to keep peace, this treaty "set apart"
for "their permanent home" a portion of what had been their native
country, and provided that no one, except U.S. Government personnel, was to enter the reserved area. Implicit in these treaty terms,
as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v.
Georgia, was the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians
remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government exists.51

The scope of the right to self-government implied by this treaty
was reaffirmed and expanded in 1972 by the Supreme Court in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission. 52 The Court stated
that "[t]he beginning of our analysis must be with the treaty which
the United States Government entered with the Navajo nation in
1868"53 and went on to hold -that ·the treaty barred the State of Arizona from imposing an income tax upon Navajos residing on ,the
reservation.
Although most of the relevant cases have involved attempted state
49. For example, the 1866 treaty with the Creek Indian Tribe provided for congressional authority over the administration of justice and for the protection of
property rights within Indian territory, subject to the proviso that "said legislation
shall not in any manner interfere with or annul their present tribal organization,
rights, laws, privileges, and customs." Treaty with the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866,
art. X, 14 Stat. 785, 788 (1868). See ~lso 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN LAws AND
TREATIES 702, 705 (1903).
50. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
51. 358 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added). Because the Court in Williams ruled
that implied treaty rights precluded the implication of state jurisdiction, the case
does not directly settle the question of implied federal jurisdiction. However, the
rationale of the Court-that the internal affairs of Indians remain within the jurisdiction of Indian governments absent express jurisdictional grants elsewhere by Congress-also supports a prohibition on implied federal jurisdiction. See text at notes
54-58 infra. The Court used the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970),
which expressly grants jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases involving enumerated Indian offenses, as an example of an express congressional grant of jurisdiction
over the internal affairs of Indians. It supports the conclusion that the Court intended to prohibit implied federal jurisdiction as well as implied state jurisdiction.
52. 411 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1973) ("it cannot be doubted that the reservation
of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the land
as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos . . .").
53. 411 U.S. at 174. See also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
96 S. Ct. 1634 (1976).
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incursions upon Indian rights, the principles of law derived from them
are also applicable to federal intrusions absent a finding of specific
congressional intent to abrogate a treaty obligation. 54 Thus, in one
case, ,the Supreme Court held that a .treaty transferring the fee to
land "free of all charges or incumbrances whatsoever" exempted the
land from federal taxation of timber sales. 55 Recently, the Eighth
Circuit held that an implicit treaty right for Indians ,to hunt on their
reservation immunized them from prosecution for hunting bald eagles
-an endangered species generally protected ·by statute. 56 Moreover,
the implication of self-government rights against federal incursions
is also supported by the Supreme Court's frequent assertion that "treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as ,they would have understood them." 57 It is· difficult to see -how federal interference with
internal Indian affairs would have ·been understood by Indian treaty
signatories as less obnoxious than state interference. Few Indian
nations, if any, would have construed their treaties to permit federal
court review of actions -taken by their tribal governments. 58 The
wording of treaties does not suggest that some rights are to receive
fuller protection than oth{?rs, and treaty -rights to self-government are
certainly no less deserving of respect than the right to hunt or immunity from •taxation.
The existence of a treaty right, whether express or implied, does
not, however, pose an absolute bar to congressional action in violation
of .that right. It is well established that where a treaty and an aot of
Congress -are in direct conflict, the later in date :prevails. 59 Thus,
although the express -provisions of ICRA providing for habeas corpus
review in the federal courts60 violate prior treaties granting the right
of self-government, these provisions should be enforced. Before
abrogating treaty rights, however, courts must carefully examine both
the impact of the remedy on the right and the intent of Congress in
enacting ICRA.
Although the quantum of congressional intent that must be manifested in a statute or its legislative history to support a finding of abro54. See note 51 supra.
55. Squire v.. Copoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956).
56. United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974). For a discussion
of statutory abrogation of treaty rights, see text at notes 59-72 infra.
57. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
58. Some treaties indicate that the signatories understood that the United States
would take control of internal Indian affairs. For example, the 1867 treaty with
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indian tribes provides that "[t]he United States may
pass such laws o_n the subject of . . . the government of the Indians on said reservations . . . as may be thought proper." Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, Oct.
28, 1867, art. VI, 15 Stat. 593, 595 (1869). However, such treaties have been
criticized as having been negotiated with improper Indian parties. See P. FARB,
MAN'S RISE TO ClvILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE !NDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 30
(1968).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Len Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970); note 4 supra.

220

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 7S:210

gation has not been uniformly defined, all of the courts have set up a
heavy presumption against abrogation. 61 In fact, the Supreme Court
has not found an Indian treaty to have been abrogated by less than
express language· in the past fifty years. 62 In the leading case of
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 63 the Court considered whether a
congressional act terminating federal supervision over an Indian
tribe abrogated ,the hunting and fishing rights previously guaranteed
by treaty. Despite the seemingly unequivocal language of the act
that after termination of the reservation "the laws of the several states
shall apply to ,the tribe and its members in the same manner as they
apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction," 04 the
Court noted that the act did not explicitly terminate treaty rights 66
and, finding the legislative history to be ambiguous, 66 declined to
construe the act "as a back-handed way" of achieving ,this result. 61
The Court went on to say that "[w]hile the power to abrogate those
rights exists . . . 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not
to be lightly imputed to the Congress.' " 68
Although the Menominee Tribe opinion presents only a sparse
analytical framework for ascertaining the precise level of express
congressional intent needed to abrogate treaty rights, the case at the
61. Courts use various expressions to describe the presumption against abrogation. See Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time
is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 623-28 (197S). A common formulation of the
test is that abrogation shall not be "lightly implied." Id. at 62S. See, e.g., Squire
v. Capoeman, 3S1 U.S. 1, 8 (19S6); Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d S64, S68 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974); Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Minn. 1971). However, the Supreme Court
has recently shown a preference for the formulation that abrogation will be found
"only upon a clear showing" of congressional intent. Wilkinson & Volkman,
supra, at 623; see DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 42S, 444 (197S);
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, SOS (1973). Under either formulation of the test,
it is clear that a court will find a treaty to have been abrogated by a statute only if
the face of the statute or the surrounding circumstances and legislative history evidence a congressional intent to abrogate. See Decoteau v. District County Ct., 420
U.S. 425, 445 (1975) (face of statute, surrounding circumstances, and legislative history all clearly showed abrogative intent); Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d 463, 466
(9th Cir. 1961) (face of statute created strong implication of intent to abrogate).
62. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 61, at 630.
63. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
64. 391 U.S. at 410.
65. 391 U.S. at 408.
66. Senator Watkins, author of the bill in question, stated that the bill " 'in
no way violate[s) any treaty obligation with this tribe.'" 391 U.S. at 413, quoting 100
CONG. REC. 8538 (1954). However, "counsel for the Menominees spoke against
the bill, arguing that' its silence would by implication abolish those hunting and
fishing rights." 391 U.S. at 408, citing Joint Hearings on S. 2813, H.R. 2828, and
H.R. 7135 Before Subcommittees of Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 697, 704 (1954).
67. 391 U.S. at 412.
68. 391 U.S. at 412-13, quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138,
160 (1934).
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very least requires courts to analyze carefully the legislative history
of acts that conflict with those rights and to find a strong legislative
intent to support their abrogation. 69 More recently, the Eighth Circuit went even further in the case of United States v. White, 70 where
it considered whether the Bald Eagle Protection Act71 had implicitly
repealed a treaty right to hunt. The court concluded that "[t]o affect
those rights [by statute], it was incumbent upon Congress to expressly
abrogate or modify the spirit of the relationship between the United
States and Red Lake Chippewa Indians on their native reservation." 72
Finding no discussion in the legislative history of the intended effect
of ,this Act on these specific treaty rights, 73 the court held that the
treaty rights had not been modified.
Despite ·the direct impact that implication of civil remedies for
ICRA violations may have upon tribal self-govemment, 74 courts
implying such remedies have uniformly failed to examine the affected
tribes' ,treaty rights and thus have not analyzed ICRA for th~ congressional intent vis-a-vis those i-ights. If a treaty provides an Indian
tribe with the rights of self-government, the principles set forth in
Menominee Tribe should bar the implication of a civil remedy. The
policy underlying the heavy presumption against abrogation is that,
because of the sanctity of treaty obligations and their binding effect
on the federal government, Congress should •be encouraged to deliberate fully on any measure that violates those obligations. Not only
did Congress fail to provide expressly for civil remedies, but the
l~gislative history75 is also devoid of any legislative consideration of
the impact that authorization of such remedies would have on the
ability of Indians to govern themselves, even though Congress did
recognize that some treaty rights might ibe involved. 76 The reluctance
69. A stricter test has been suggested: "Treaty rights should be abrogated only
by an explicit congressional statement, both of the specific promises about to be
broken and of the intent of Congress to break them." Wilkinson & Volkman, supra
note 61, at 660-61. Titls test would assure congressional awareness of treaty
breaches because abrogation could only be found from the face of a statute.
70. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1970) (amended 1972).
72. 508 F.2d at 457-58 (emphasis added).
73. 508 F.2d at 458.
74. See text at notes 7-23 supra.
75. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-124 (1969); 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 4, at 815-905 (1963); 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1, 2, 3 (1962).
76. ICRA was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, 82 Stat. 73, which also provided for riot control and which prohibited
housing discrimination. The assassination of Martin Luther King created strong
pressure to pass the entire Act quickly. · See 114 CONG. REc. 9553, 9615, 9620
(1968). In this atmosphere, the Indian part of the bill was quickly put through
committee, see Hearings on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 23, 40, 43 (1968), and the only congressional recognition of treaty rights
occurred incidentally during an argument over whether ICRA should be attached to
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of courts to -abrogate •treaty rights has actually led them to bend express statutory language to avoid abrogation. 77 Implication of a civil
remedy by a federal court is a :radical departure from past practice.
Although it must be recognized that ihe rights established by ICRA
are important ones by Anglo-American legal standards, and ·are indeed binding on ,the tribal governments, it appears improper for a
federal court to imply a civil remedy for a suit brought against an
Indian nation -that has been guaranteed .by treaty the right to selfgovernment.
B.

Tribal Sovereignty

Even in the absence of a treaty guaranteeing the right to self•
government, •the courts have consistently recognized that Indian governments possess some sovereignty with respect to internal tribal
affairs. 78 As early as 1831, the Supreme Court characterized the
Cherokee Nation as "a state, as a district political society, separated
from others, capable of managing its own affairs ·and governing it•
self .. ·.." 79 A year later, Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed the
sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation:
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does
not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state,
in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state.80

These principles have been repeatedly acknowledged in subsequent
federal case Iaw,81 and as recently as 1975 the Supreme Court again
the Civil Rights Act, see 114 CoNG. R.Ec. 5837 (1968), rather than as an expression
of congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights.
77. See, e.g., Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 58 (1895); United States v. White,
508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Bennet County v. United States, 394 F.2d 8 (8th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724 (D. Idaho 1941).
78. Tribal "immunity" from the application of federal or state law based upon
tribal sovereignty should not be confused with the narrower issue of tribal immunity from suit based upon -traditional notions of sovereign immunity. Sovereign
immunity operates as a defense to an alleged claim based on applicable law. For
discussions of Indian sovereign immunity, which could also raise a bar to civil
actions under ICRA, see United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
309 U.S. 506 (1940); M. PRICE, supra note 26, at 747-48; Zionitz, supra note 25.
Tribal immunity operates to render inapplicable the law upon which a claim is based,
Tribal sovereignty over internal Indian affairs includes the power to define forms ot
government, to tax, to regulate domestic relations, and to administer criminal justice
in many types of cases. For discussions of internal tribal sovereignty, see F. CoHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122-50 (1942); M. PRICE, supra note 26, at
118-82.
79. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11 (1831).
80. Worchester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (emphasis
added).
81. See, e.g., Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
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recognized that Indian nations were "unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."82
The existence of tribal sovereignty does not preclude congressional
action that violates it. Indeed, the powers of Indian governments
have often been limited by Congress pursuant to the wardship
power. 83 As with treaty rights, however, the courts have held that
Indian nations retain sovereignty over internal affairs except where
expressly qualified by a congressional act.
The Supreme Court recognized the -existence of this "express
qualification" requirement in Williams v. Lee,84 in which a state
court was attempting to exercise jurisdiction over a member of an
Indian nation. After noting that non-Indians could be prosecuted
in a state court for a crime against a non-Indian on a reservation,
the Court stated that, as a general proposition, if the crime was by
or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on
other Courts by Congress has remained exclusive." 85 As an example of this proposition the Court referred to the Major Crimes
Act, 86 which expressly grants federal court jurisdiction over certain
crimes committed by Indians. 87
This "express qualification" requirement has been directly applied to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts over Indians. In Dicke
v. Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes, 88 for example, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that a statute ceding land to the CheyenneArapahoe Tribe could be interpreted as impliedly authorizing Indians to sue their tribal governments in federal court. 89 The court
then went on to say:
Traditionally, however, and in recognition of the fact that the power
to regulate Indian affairs lies exclusively with Congress and not the
courts, such statutes have been strictly construed. In [a previous
case], we indicated that express authorization was necessary to overcome the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes ·. . . . Again and
recently this court has held that federal court jurisdiction does not
131, 133-34 (10th Cir. 1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 92-93
(8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, 389 F. Supp.
235, 237 (D. Neb. & D. S.D. 1975).
82. United States v. Mazurine, 419 U.S. 544, 5557 (1975).
83. A principle of international law, the doctrine of wardship between nations
describes the relationship between conquering and dependent nations and has been
used by the Supreme Court to describe the relationship between the United States and
Indian nations. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (I-886); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). For a discussion of the wardship
doctrine as applied to Indians, see F. COHEN, supra note 78, at 169-73.
84. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). For a discussion of the treaty aspects of Williams,
see text at notes 50-51 supra.
85. 358 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
86. 18 u.s.c. § 1153 (1970).
87. 358 U.S. at 220 n.5. See also note 51 supra.
88. 304 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1962).
89. 304 F.2d at 114.
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lie in a matter of controversy between Indians and the Tribe "unless
jurisdiction is expressly conferred by congressional enactment." 90
Since the statute in the case at bar did not contain an express authorization of jurisdiction, the suit was dismissed.
Thus, the state of federal Indian law as described in 1940 by
Felix Cohen, a noted authority on Indian law, remains the same today:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal
powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles:
( 1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of
any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the
legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates
the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter
into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by iself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian
tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government. 91
By allowing ICRA civil suits, courts have for the first time, by implication of a statute, deprived an Indian nation of an aspect of sover-eignty. 02 Given the degree of infringement presented by civil suits
90. 304 F.2d at 114-15 (citations omitted).
91. F. COHEN, supra note 78, at 123.
92. A recent Supreme Court decision has reduced the geographic area within a
tribal government's jurisdiction on the basis of implications derived from a congressional statute. Decoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975). If such
a reduction constitutes deprivation of an aspect of internal Indian sovereignty, then
DeCoteau represents a second instance of infringement through implication.
Indian country, over which Indian tribes have jurisdiction, includes "all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation . • . and all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970). In
DeCoteau, South Dakota courts asserted jurisdiction over Indian acts done on lands
within a reservation created by treaty in 1867, but owned and settled by nonIndians since 1891. The issue was whether the Act of March 3, 1891, c.543, 26 Stat.
1035, which ratified an agreement between the United States and the SissetonWahpeton Tribe .under which the tribe sold to the United States their unallotted
land, terminated the reservation status of that land and thus exposed it to state jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970). The Court held the reservation status to
have been terminated despite the absence of express language to that effect in
the Act.
Decoteau, however, does not provide support for implying civil remedies under
ICRA. First, the implication of civil remedies under ICRA directly interferes with
powers of tribal sovereignty, see text at notes 7-23 supra, while DeCoteau affects
only the georgraphical scope within which powers of tribal sovereignty may be
exercised.
Second, the Court found the reservation status to have been terminated only
after finding evidence of congressional intent sufficient to override the presumption
against abrogation of treaties by statute. See note 61 supra. As has been noted,
no evidence exists concerning congressional intent in ICRA sufficient to override
the presumption against treaty abrogation. See note 76 supra & text at notes 75-76
supra. There is, therefore, inadequate justification for interference with tribal
sovereignty.
Finally, the Court in Decoteau emphasized that the Act was "not a unilateral
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upon internal Indian affairs, 93 and recognizing that the Senate subcommittee that drafted ICRA recognized that Indian sovereignty
may be qualified only by express legislation,94 this departure from
precedent is unwarranted.
Underlying the "express qualification" requirement are important
principles of judicial review and separation of powers. Weighing
most heavily against implication is the doctrine that Indian policy
should be made solely by the political branches of government. In
the landmark reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr, 95 the Court defined the contours of the political question doctrine96 and discussed
the influence of this doctrine in limiting the extent of the judiciary's
role in Indian affairs. 97 Several of the features enumerated by the
Court are present in the implication of a civil remedy that infringes
upon Indian sovereignty.
In United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, 98 the
court, without referring to Baker and without expressly mentioning
the political question doctrine, used an analysis similar to that mandated by Baker. In this case the criminal defendants argued, inter
alia, that Indian sovereignty barred federal jurisdiction over alleged
crimes by Indians on a reservation. 99 In upholding federal jurisdiction, the court recognized that the Constitution requires commitment of Indian matters to the political branches of the govemment,1° 0
action by Congress but the ratification of a previously negotiated agreement, to
which a tribal majority consented." 420 U.S. at 448. In contrast, ICRA was not
formally approved by the Indian nations affected by its enactment, and many Indian
leaders oppose ICRA. See Coulter, supra note 6, at 50.
93. See text at notes 7-23 supra.
94. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTlTUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON nm
JUDICL\RY, 88m CONG., 2D SESS., CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF TilE AMERICAN INDIAN
4 (Comm. Print 1964).
95. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
96. 369 U.S. at 217:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there
should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's presence.
97. 369 U.S. at 215.
98. 389 F. Supp. 235, 239 (D. Neb. & D.S.D. 1975).
99. 389 F. Supp. atJ 236.
100. 389 F. Supp. at 239:
[I']he people of the United States have not given me or any other judge the
power to set national policy for them. By the Constitution the people have
assigned governmental powers and have set their limits. Relations with Indian
tribes are given exclusively to the executive and legislative branches. Perhaps

226

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:210

and, hence, that the court must look to the legislative and executive
branches to define the limits on federal incursion into Indian affairs.
Although the specific result in Wounded Knee did not restrict intervention in internal Indian affairs, the case nonetheless stands for the
proposition that since policy-making in Indian affairs belongs exclusively to the political branches of government, the courts should
be reluctant to construe ·a statute in a manner that expands the role
of the judiciary in Indian affairs. The pervasive role that some courts
have assumed in allowing civil challenges to the actions of an Indian
government is directly contrary to this proposition.
The underlying reason for such reluctance, according to the
Wounded Knee court, is that "legislative bodies have investigative
tools for listening to a wider community than do courts for ferreting
out the deeper consciousness of the body politic," and those who are
elected represent "an amalgam of many . . . [that] is more likely to
reflect the conscience and wisdom of the people than a few who are
appointed." 101 The problems of how to define the rights of individual
Indians within the tribal context and how best to protect those rights
are best left to the Congress.
Baker v. Carr states that courts must not deviate from adherence
to a political decision already made102 by the Congress in the area
of Indian affairs and should not make decisions that may be
"hampered by . . . possible interference with a Congressional program. "103 The currently stated policy of Congress104 and of the
executive branch105 is that Indian sovereignty should be enhanced;
ICRA itself establishes a policy of consultation with Indians before
any action is taken that will affect them. 100 Such policies are predicated upon a long history of conflict and negotiation. As the court
stated in the Wounded Knee cases:
[R]elations with American Indians are rooted in international relations . . . , including the laws of conquest and of treaties developed
over centuries, not by courts, but by executive heads of nations
through negotiations. The United States in its early history accepted
in its dealings with other nations the European concepts. Perhaps
it should not have done so in its relations with the American Indians.
it should be otherwise, but it is not. When and if the people amend the Constitution to put limits on the executive and legislative branches in their affairs with
Indian tribes, the federal courts will uphold those limits, but in the meantime
the courts cannot create limits. In short, a judge must hold government to
the standards of the nation's conscience once declared, but he cannot create the
conscience or declare the standards (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
101. 389 F. Supp. at 239.
102. 369 U.S. at 2.17.
103. 369 U.S. at 215-16 n.43.
104. S. Con. Res. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNo. REC. 46383 (1971).
See also S. 2010, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1975).
105. Message on American Indians by President Nixon, July 8, 1970, in M.
PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 597 (1973).
1Q6. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1321(a), 1322(c) (1970).
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But it did. Changing now, after nearly two centuries, is a matter of
massive public policy for broader exploration than courts are able
to provide. Essentially, the issues here have to do with the methods
of shifting power from one group to another-by· war, threat of war,
economic pressure or indictment, verbal persuasion, election, agreement, or gradual legislative encroachment. The acceptability of each
method should be decided by the citizenry at large, which speaks
directly or through its elected representatives. 107

Absent any express Congressional determination to the contrary, the
courts should conclude that the judicial branch is the improper forum
for obtaining relief for a grievance involving the sovereignty of an
Indian nation.108
Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, the threshold
question at this stage of analysis-whether the Indian nation possesses
requisite sovereignty-must be decided. -It will not always be true
that an Indian tribe posesses the degree of sovereignty necessary to
set up a bar to the imposition of "foreign" jurisdiction over the Indians absent express federal legislation. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States109 the Supreme Court was faced with the question whether Oklahoma state inheritance laws applied to income that
Indians received from oil wells. Noting that the Oklahoma Indians did
not live on reservations and that they held their land in fee, the Court
rejected the claini that all Indians are exempt from taxation:
The underlying principles on which these decisions are based do no~
fit the situation of the Oklahoma Indians. Although there are remnants of the form of tribal sovereignty, these Indians have no effective
tribal autonomy . . . ; they are actually citizens of the State with
little to distinguish them from all other citizens except for their limited
property restrictions and their tax exemptions.11°

The Court •then proceeded to .find state jurisdiction to impose a tax
on the basis of traditional, non-Indian rules for analysis of legislative
history and statutory construction.111
Similarly, not all Indian governments have been found to possess
the requisite degree of sovereignty to support a bar to federal court
jurisdiction over suits against them. In the 1965 case of Colli/lower
v. Garland, 112 for example, a federal court found jurisdiction to hear
107. 389 F. Supp. at 239.
108. Cases in which implied remedies are sought under ICRA may present
the federal courts with such quesmons as whether electricity should be introduced
into cultural and religious areas of a Pueblo. See Peoples Committee v. Tribal
Council, Civil No. 75-393 (D. N.M., filed July 9, 1975). These seem to be the kinds
of issues to which the Supreme Court in Baker was referring when it stated that
if courts are "hampered by problems of the management of unusual evidence,"
they should rely on congressional determination. 369 U.S. at 215-16 n.43.
109. 319 U.S. 598 (1943).
'
110. 319 U.S. at 603 (citations omitted).
111. The Court did not require an express statement of congressional intent to rescind the tax exemption generally possessed by Indians.
112. 342 F.2d 36!> (9th Cir. 1965).
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a habeas corpus action by an :J;ndian imprisoned by an Indian government. The court found the sovereignty bar to federal court review inapplicable to the Gros Ventres Indians because of the pervasive federal presence in the Indian courts: "Under these circumstances, we think that these courts function in part as a federal agency
and in part as a tribal agency, and that consequently it is competent
for a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the
legality of the detention of an Indian pursuant .to ·an order of an Indian
_court." 113 Neither the Oklahoma Tax Commission nor the Colliflower courts found that the statute or remedy involved overrode Indian sovereignty. They instead determined that the Indian nations involved lacked sovereignty,114 apparently on the theory that the absence
of a truly independent tribal government created an expectation that
the government would operate pursuant to external regulation.
Several major factors are crucial to the determination of independence. The· most important is whether the Indian tribe retains
its traditional form of government or has been reorganized pursuant
to a federal statute. 115 Governments based on traditional Indian
culture should not be seen as "a part of a federal agency" over which
federal courts have jurisdiction, but those organized pursuant to a
federal statute116 may be in a much different position. Many such
governments operate under constitutions drafted by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), 117 which often provide for review and approval
of tribal ordinances by the Secretary of Interior118 and for adherence
to the United States Constitution and federal law. 119
Although federally reorganized Indian governments have obviously relinquished some degree of their sovereignty, a court should
not mechanically conclude that these governments are "federal agencies" subject to federal judicial review. The extent to which the
113. 342 F.2d at 379.
114. In Colli/lower, the Gros Ventres Indians had been organized pursuant to
the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-92 (1970), which subjected
their bylaws and constitution to approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1970). Also, Indian prisoners were confined in a county jail by
contract between the federal and county government. 342 F.2d at 374.
,
115. Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969). There
are 485 federally recognized Indian governments. The organizational structures of
52 have been federally approved though not authorized by statute. In addition,
224 traditional Indian governments have been federally recognized without any formal
federal approval of their organizational structures. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN ENTITIES (1975).
116. See Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
117. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE CoMM. ON nm
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 94, at 4.
118. See Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REv. 955, 968, 976-77 (1972). Amendments to constitutions
drafted by the BIA require approval by the Secretary of Interior. 25 U.S.C. §
476 (1970).
119. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON TIIB
JUDICIARY, supra note 94, at 5.
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continuing tribal governmental process is actually intertwined with
federal action must be considered. Secretarial approval is not necessarily evidence of a continual involvement of federal instrumentalities
in the Indian government's conduct of affairs. Approval may sometimes be granted automatically, and Indian governments may, on
occasion, simply ignore the requirement and not submit tribal actions
for such review. 120 Additionally, efforts of a tribe to amend its
constitution to restrict secretarial review, affirmative tribal reaction
to a statute authorizing Indian governments to assume supervision of
BIA employees,121 an insubstantial role of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the tribal government, 122 and a limited reliance of the
tribe on BIA funding of reservation activities123 all should be persuasive evidence that the tribal government is not in fact acting "in
part as a federal agency."
·
A second factor that should be considered in determining tribal
independence is the degree to which the Indian tribe has retained
its traditional language, religion, and culture. Traditional Indians
are less likely to have an expectation of federal regulation of their
internal tribal customs. Even where departures from traditional
customs exist, however, courts should not exaggerate their importance,
since Indians are frequently less concerned with rigidly preserving
particular forms or practices than they are with being permitted to
evolve in a distinctly Indian manner, free from outside interference.12 4'
Finally, the Indian nation's attitude toward federal domination
should be examined. Passage by the tribal council of a resolution
condemning the Indian policy of the United States as colonialist125
and active opposition by the Indian government to the enactment of
ICRA are evidence that there is neither an expectation nor an acceptance of operating pursuant to federal regulation.
Although no formulation may be presented by which a· federal
court can precisely ascertain the extent of sovereignty possessed by
an Indian tribe, a court should at least weigh these factors before
considering the implication of a civil remedy under ICRA. If the
Indian nation is found to possess a degree of sovereignty sufficient to
support the conclusion that it expects to conduct its internal affairs free
120. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN TRmES AS GOVERN135, 138-39 (June ed. 1975).
121. 25 u.s.c. § 48 (1970).
122. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 374 (9th Cir. 1965). Appointment of a chief of an Indian government by the 'President further evidences extensive
federal involvement. See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674,677 (10th Cir. 1971).
123. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1965).
124. See v. DELORIA, BEHIND nm TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 7, 206 (1974);
Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing
of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1061, 1080 (1974) •.
125. Resolution of March 26, 1974, Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Council and
Resolution of Feb. 16, 1975, Pitt River Tribal Council, in Minutes to the Conference
on International Law of the International Indian Treaty Council (Feb. 21, 1975).
MENTS
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from federal regulation, then no civil remedy should be implied
under ICRA.126
C.

Implying a Civil Remedy

Even if an Indian tribe possesses neither treaty rights nor a
requisite degree of sovereignty to bar the implication of civil remedies
under ICRA, a civil remedy still should not be lightly implied by
a federal court. The Supreme Court has developed a framework
of analysis for implied remedies in several areas of non-Indian law
that provides a suitable starting point for assessing the desirability
of implication under ICRA. The analysis provides for consideration
of a number of policy issues already raised concerning Indian law
that should persuade courts to refrain from exceeding the express
provisions of the Act.
This framework was 1'ecently summarized and applied in Cort v.
Ash.121 At issue in Cort was whether a penal statute prohibiting
campaign contributions by corporations128 would support a shareholder's civil action to secure derivative damage relief against corporate directors for violation of that statute. The Supreme Court
delineated four factors relevant to a determination of whether a
court should imply a private remedy for a statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," ... that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
126. Many of the courts implying a civil remedy under ICRA have done so only
after requiring an exhaustion of tribal remedies. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River
Sioux, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); White v. Tribal Council, 383 F. Supp. 810
(D. Minn. 1974). While this practice may reduce the infringement of treaty rights
and Indian sovereignty, it fails to protect fully Indian autonomy for two reasons.
First, the presumption against treaty abrogation, see text at notes 61-62 supra, and
the express qualification requirement, see text at notes 83-90 supra, mandate that the
Congress actually considers treaty rights and Indian sovereignty when passing legislation and, thus, guarantee Indians an opportunity to apply political pressure to prevent
congressional imposition of Anglo legal values. Requiring exhaustion of Indian
remedies fails to present such a political opportunity.
Second, requiring exhaustion of Indian remedies only delays interference with
tribal rule; tribal governments are still under pressure to follow federal law to avoid
the embarrassment of being reversed. See Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 729 (8th
Cir. 1915). This pressure is eliminated by the presumption against abrogation and
the express qualification requirement, which isolate a sphere of exclusive tribal jurisdiction.
127. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (amended 1972 & 1974).
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it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law? 129

It will now be shown that both the legislative history of ICRA and
the traditional policy of federal abstention from internal Indian affairs
support the conclusion that no civil remedy should be implied from
ICRA.
A review of the legislative history indicates that criminal defendants constituted the class of persons for whose especial benefit ICRA
was enacted. First, the focus of the hearings carried on for the five
years preceding the Act's passage was on the deprivation of rights
within the Indian criminal justice system.130 Second, the testimony
of Senator Ervin, chairman of the subcommittee that considered the
legislation, emphasizes criminal proceedings: "The first title makes
the Bill of Rights applicable to an Indian when he is charged with a
crime by a tribal court, thus assuring the Indian citizen the basic
rights and privileges in his relationship with his trj.bal government
that every other American citizen now has in his relationship with
his State, local and Federal Govemments." 131 Finally, these indications of intent drawn from the congressional record are reinforced
by general rules of construction and by a look at the context in which
ICRA was passed. Thus, the familiar canon of statutory construction, that expressio unius est exclusius alterius, 132 suggests .that because habeas corpus was the sole express remedy in ICRA,133 and
was viewed as an effective enforcement mechanism,134 it should be
construed as the only intended remedy.
This interpretation is reinforced by a glance at other civil rights
legislation. The Fair Housing Act, for example, with which ICRA
was passed, specifically established a civil remedy,135 while the 1964
Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation, expressly provided that either the Attorney General136
129. 422 U.S. at 78, quotil)g Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916) (emphasis added by Court).
130. See authorities cited note 75 supra.
131. Hearings on H.R. 15419 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-23, at
132 (1968). See 113 CONG. REC. 35474 (1967) (remarks of Senator Ervin). Such
a specific statement by Senator Ervin seems far more indicative of legislative intent
than do general remarks made by him concerning the expansion of constitutional
rights. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 35,472 (1967). For another statement of a congressman emphasizing criminal proceedings, see 114 CoNG. REC. 9596 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Meeds).
132. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies,
courts should not expand the coverage of the statute ·to subsume other remedies").
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970) reprinted in note 4 supra.
134. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 9552-53 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Reifel).
135. 42 u.s.c. § 3612 (1970).
136. 42
§ 2000a-5 (1970).
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or private parties137 could bring sui_ts in federal courts for injunctive
relief. 138 Moreover, Congress demonstrated its awareness of the
potential intrusiveness of ICRA into Indian sovereignty by taking
no action on both a bill providing for a trial de novo in federal court
for the deprivation of civil rights139 and a provision to allow the Attorney General to bring civil or criminal actions to vindicate Indian
rights. 14 ° Congress showed its concern with the scope of federal
court intervention into Indian affairs and limited the available remedy
accordingly. 141
In fact, an underlying purpo.c;e of ICRA, in addition to the protection of criminal plaintiffs, was •the promotion of the sovereignty
of Indian governments. This concern is clearly reflected in Title IV
of the Act. 142 Under congressional authorization prior to ICRA,
states did not need the consent of the tribes to .assume both civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indians. 143 Title IV was .a response by
Congress to bitter Indian complaints concerning the exercise of state
jurisdiction.144 It made consent of the involved Indian government
a prerequisite to .further state assumption of criminal145 or civil jurisdiction146 and authorized states to retrocede previously assumed jurisdiction over Indians. 147 This provision, in conjunction with Title
ill of the Act, which ,provides that proper qualifications of judges in
-tribal courts and a ,waining program for tribal judges be established,148
demonstrates that a major purpose of ICRA is to revest authority to
the tribes and to upgrade tribal courts.149
·
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970).
138. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 3(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a)-(c)
(1970 & Supp. 1975) also expressly provides for civil remedies.
139. See S. 962, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The bill never emerged from
committee. See also Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill
of Rights, 45 N.D.L. REV. 337, 347 (1969). But see Brunett, An Historical Analysis
of the 1968 "Indian Civil Rights" Act, 9 HARV. J. l..EG1s. 557, 602 (1972).
140. See S. 963, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (the bill never emerged from
committee); Zionitz, supra note 25, at 13-14.
141. In the 1969 hearings on S. 211, which contained identical language to
Title II of ICRA and would have amended ICRA in other respects, Senator Ervin,
in addressing the scope of federal review of civil and criminal trials, remarked:
"The only provision in this bill that provides for federal court interference is writ
of habeas corpus .••." Hearings on S. 211 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
142. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1321-26 (1970). '
143. M. PRICE, supra note 26, at 103-04, 213-18.
144. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON TIIE JUDICIARY,
supra note 94, at 9-14.
145. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970).
146. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
147. 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1970).
148. 25 u.s.c. § 1311(3)-(4) (1970).
149. Attributing to ICRA the purpose of fostering Indian sovereignty places
ICRA harmoniously within the broadly stated national policy of Indian self-determination. See Message on American Indians by President Nixon, supra note 105
("The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions
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Not only :is the implication of civil remedies contrary to the purpose of fostering Indian self-determination, but such implication is
not necessary .to protect the rights created by ICRA. Courts suggesting that failure to imply a civil remedy would render the Act
unenforceable and ineffectual are in error. 15° First, those provisions
that guarantee rights :to criminal defendants151 may be enforced by
the express habeas corpus action. 152 Moreover, normally e~pansive
constitutional provisions such ,as the due process and equal ,protection clauses, 153 -though limited if applica:ble only in ha:beas corpus
proceedings, would effectively guarantee rights of the criminally
accused. Second, even if such constitutional provisions as ,the right
to free speech154 and the prohibition on the taking of property without
just compensation155 cannot be fully enforceable in federal courts
•through a habeas corpus proceeding, these -rights may still be enforceable in Indian courts.156 Tribes organized under the federal
reorganization act157 often have provisions in their constitutions that
incorporate into Indian jurisprudence rights created under federal
statute. 158 Tribal courts are .the most desirable forum for accommofor a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian
decisions"); S. Con. Res. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REC. 46383 ( 1971):
That it is the sense of Congress that (1) our national Indian policy shall give
full recognition to and be predicated upon the unique relationship that exists between this group of citizens and the Federal Government and that a government wide commitment shall derive from this relationship that will be designed
to give Indians the freedom and encouragement to develop their individual,
family, and community potential and to determine their own future to the
maximum extent possible . • . (3) improving the quality and quantity of social
and economic development efforts for Indian people and maximizing opportunities for Indian control and self-determination shall be a major goal of our national Indian policy (emphasis added).
150. See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973}; Luxon
v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1972); Loncassion v. Leekity,
334 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.N.M. 1971). See also de Raismes, supra note 112, at 91;
Comment, supra note 25, at 1371.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2) (1970) (search and seizure); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(3)
(1970) (double jeopardy); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4) (1970) (self-incrimination); 2S
U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1970) (speedy trial, compulsory process, information as to nature
of accusation); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1970) (bail, excessive fines and imprisonment,
cruel and unusual punishment); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1970) (right to jury trial);
note 3 supra.
152. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970) reprinted in note 4 supra.
153. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
154. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra.
156. Zionitz, supra note 25, at 8; see legal memorandum of Mr. Kent Frizzell, the
Solicitor to the Interior .Department, to tbe Department of Justice, May 22, 1974,
at 10-11, quoted in Zionitz, supra note 25, at 9 n.33: "Nor would [failure to imply
remedies beyond habeas corpus] . . . render meaningless the substantive provisions of
section 1302. Those provisions clearly bind tribal courts as well as all other tribal
officers, and in addition bind the Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of his
supervisory control over certain types of tribal action."
157. 25 u.s.c. §§ 461-79 (1970).
158. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OP SE.NATE COMM. ON nm JUDICIARY, supra note 94, at 5.
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dating Anglo-American rights with ,traditional Indian oulture. 1110
Thus, courts implying civil remedies have ignored the emphasis
on criminal justice and -the sensitivity -to sovereignty that indicate
congressional intent to provide federal court review only to the extent
.that criminal rights :were at stake. The dual, and sometimes conflicting, purposes of ICRA in fostering Indian self-determination and
yet protecting tlie rights of Indians vis-a-vis their tribal governments
-are 1best effectuated by limiting federal judicial intervention to the
sole remedy of habeas corpus.160
This conclusion remains unchanged after consideration of the
fuial factor deemed relevant in Cort-whether "the cause of action
[is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States . . . ." 161 Indian tribes have jurisdiction over
their internal affairs162 analogous to that possessed by the states. 183
With the exception of recent cases in which courts have implied civil
remedies for violations of ICRA, federal courts have assumed an
adjudicatory role over internal Indian controversies only where there
was an express congressional mandate164 or where Indian sovereignty
had already been substantially diminished.165
There is simply no basis in precedent for the federal courts to
imply such civil remedies, and the policy considerations that have
countenanced judicial restraint :remain persuasive. First, the legisla,tive and executive -branches have traditionally defined the relationship of the federal government to the Indians;106 these branches are
most qualified to weigh the consequences of any measure affecting
tribal independence. The implication of civil remedies for ICRA
not only portends fundamental changes in Indian government but
may also place substantial financial burdens upon the tribes, both
in ,the cost of litigation167 and the potential for damages. 108 Most
Indian nations ,are not wealthy, 169 and their income is allocated to
ibenefit rthe entire tribe. Given ·the limited ability of tribes to bear
increased financial burdens, the imposition of civil remedies may
very well lead -to a loss of jobs and services in the Indian community.110
159. See text at notes 171-72 infra.
160. But see Comment, supra note 25, at 1371.
161. 422 U.S. at 78.
162. See text at notes 47-58 supra.
163. Cf. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895).
164. See text at notes 84-91 supra.
165. See text at notes 109-26 supra.
166. See text at notes 95-107 supra.
167. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 55.
See also Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895).
168. See, e.g., Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971 ).
169. See A. JosEPHY, RED POWER; THE AMERICAN INDIANS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM
3 (1971).
170. See Zionitz supra note 25, at 33-34.
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A second, and more important, policy reason for preserving
tribal courts as the forums for ,adjudicating individual rights is the
inherent ethnocentrism of ,the federal courts. Concepts of law within
the federal judiciary are ,based primarily upon Anglo-American legal
principles. When conflicts -are brought into a federal court, issues
will be framed •according to these principles and may ignore incompatible traditions -that have legitimacy among the Indian people. 171
If Indian .customs are ,to withstand the pressures exerted by the AngloAmerican system of law, great sensitivity to Indian culture will be
necessary-sensitivity that would clear~y be mq_re available in tribal
courts. The wholesale exposure of tribal governmental systems to
a culturally removed federal judiciary is an extreme and momentous
development; it should not come about through implication from
a statute ,that merely represents .the initial e~tension by Congress of
the federal judicial power into tribal government. 172
The trend in federal Indian law since the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934173 has been to allow increasing tribal autonomy. Statutes have, for instance, authorized Indian nations to take control of
BIA employees.174 A primary purpose of ICRA itself is to enhance
the prospects of Indian sovereignty. 175 The Act provides for retrocession of ourrently held state authority over Indian nations. 176 and
requires consent of Indian ,tribes prior to any expansion of such
authority. 177 Coupled with a growing consciousness ·among Indians
of the values in ,their traditional culture, such statutes may even allow
Indian nations currently considered "a part of a federal agency" to
regain itheir sovereignty. Absent congressional mandate, -the courts
should ibe reluctant to interfere with the evolution of Indian governments that Congress is presently supervising.
171. See Peoples Committee v. Tribal Council, Civil No. 75-393 (D.N.M., filed
July 9, 1975) (issue of whether Tribal Council can prohibit the installation of electricity because of religious principles was argued on basis of "spot-zoning" precedents).
See also Hearings on S. 211 Before Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., lst.Sess. 29 (1969) (testimony of Benny Atencio on behalf of the Santa Domingo Pueblo and the Indian Pueblo Council):
Procedural protections of due process may vary from one social context to
another. As an example: separation of powers is a basic principle in the
Government of the United States. At Santa Domingo our tribal council acts as
a legislature, a court, and the executive.
I could go on pointing out disparities but it is obvious that your way of life
is different from ours. The things you value, that which make life meaningful
to you are not the same with us in many respects. But we respect your beliefs.
We ask nothing more in return.
172. See generally M. •PRicE, supra note 26, at 749.
173. 25 u.s.c. §§ 461-79 (1970).
174. 25 u.s.c. § 48 (1970).
175. See text at notes 142-49 supra.
176. 25 u.s.c. § 1323 (1970).
177. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1321, 1322 (1970).

